The 7th Panzer Division in France and Russia: Rommel’s Ghost Division

My son loves this book. He is into first and second war

Very good read, enjoyed it thoroughly, very concise look into how these men were deployed and how they moved across the battlefield. Great use of historical reference notes, many written in Rommel's own hand....

Great, wish the book had more pages!

Under a renowned commander of World War II (Rommel) 7.Pz.D. achieved extraordinary results fighting on the offensive in France in 1940. Under a commander unknown today (Funck) the division achieved even more extraordinary results in the opening stages of the surprise offensive against the Soviet Union in 1941. In both cases the division engaged first class opponents who had vast resources in men and materiel. In both cases the Germans advanced against opponents well prepared for war, but utterly surprised by the division's direction, timing, violence and above all, tempo.The Germans of 1940-41 accepted the uncertainty in war. They embraced the central reality of uncertainty in war and rode it to operations of unparalleled tempo and daring. The German army encouraged its men to act and accepted the fact that they would make mistakes. 7.Pz.D. exemplified this philosophy. It was always right to act. It was always wrong to wait for more information, more troops, more fire support to clear up uncertainty. Rommel and Funck and the division exemplified this willingness to accept uncertainty, the determination to act, the preference of the oral order over the written.To fight as Rommel did is to do as the genius does. The genius and his division advanced at a high tempo, fought 24 hours a day, would suffer no tactical impasse, applied every weapon of the division to the fight and created stratagem after stratagem to keep things moving. The unique history and circumstances of the Germans made it necessary for them to excel in war. They grasped the essence of war: chaos, violence, uncertainty, chance and danger. They determined in a long process of more than two centuries to meet uncertainty with action. Rommel's genius was action. The genius for action was built in to the structure of 7.Pz.D. through the small action oriented staff and the similarly oriented subordinate commanders. In Russia, 7.Pz.D. advanced without Rommel even more effectively than it had in 1940. The Russian experience tells us that the genius of the division went far beyond one man. The great advances of 7.Pz.D. in Russia were based on self confidence and initiative among commanders, staff and rank and file - qualities that focus on rapid action in war. The senior leaders of 7.Pz.D allowed subordinate commanders to make mistakes. The tolerance of these leaders was never an excuse for slipshod perfomance. It was the calm recognition that rapid action in the face of uncertainty will result in errors - errors that can be overcome by more action.This book (despite some persistent and annoying typos) is an excellent operational analysis of 7.Pz.D. actions in France and Russia and summarizes impotant lessons learned for the improvement of US Marine Corps operational capabilites with suggestions for organisation, dogma and mentality. It's an astonishing study which focuses only on the essential and the important and does not delve into long narrative - it explains purely the operational art of the Wehrmacht as exemplified by the 7.PzD. in two short campaigns and nothing more. The highlight of the book for me was that superior maneuver alone DID NOT give victory to the Germans, since in every single engagement their units were far superior to their opponents in terms of training, firepower and fire control. When the German army caused 15 times more casualties to the French than it suffered itself, it's not strange that it conquered France in just six weeks. In Russia the same phenomenon happened again. The German armored thrusts tore apart the Red Army like knife cutting butter. Most of the times the Soviets attempted to stop the German advance just with fires, and not with physical contact. That was a recipe for disaster against a highly experienced and bold army like the one the Germans had. The book is highly recommended for modern operational art fans!

.. but this is available for free at the Internet Archive. Not pirated, but in its original form as a U.S. Government document.

This is a narrative for what appears to be a collage paper done by a Marine Officer on the 7th Panzer Division in France in 1940 and in Russia from 22 Jun 41 to the end of Jul 41 - NOT for the entire war in Russia. It concentrates on the German command structure of a Panzer Division in that time period, and how that lean (7 officers commanded a division. 1985 USMC Battalion and Division Command are compared, unfavorably, to that) hands on command and use of mission orientated orders allowed the Germans to timely operate within the more clumsy Allied and Russian command structure Very heavily (probably correctly) favorable to German command processes. This covers only the period of the War in France and the first two months of July in which the 7th Panzer Division fought.

A very different type of book written very well and easy to follow the text. Covers the style of leadership deployed by this division in WW2. Good maps and charts make this a good book to read. After reading I came across a little know fact that I was not aware of, the use of map reading rommel had produced with lines of march for use in coordinating movement and calling in unit locations. Great read on the unit and following commander who took over after rommel. I would have liked to known more about what happened to this division towards the end of WW2.

Not your typical history book. This is an analysis of why the 7th Panzer Division was able to move as fast and far as it did in the two campaigns.

An insightful analysis!