The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778 (Modern War Studies)

Finally I picked the book up to read. I bought it many years ago and glad I did. This is a very well thought out, concise history of the Philly Campaign and what led up to, and beyond it. I particularly liked his description of the River, Fort, and “land” sub-campaign involved in opening up the Delaware to British shipping, and in essence keeping the Anglo-Hessian Army alive. The campaign didn’t end at the Chew House. I highly recommend this book

Stephen Taaffe has written a workmanlike single-volume study of the duel between the American revolutionary army and the British regular army in and around New York and Philadelphia during 1777 and the first half of 1778. He describes all of the major players--Washington, Howe, Greene, Cornwallis, von Steuben, and Clinton--and hits the highlight events--the battles of Brandywine, Germantown, Paoli, and Monmouth, efforts to close the Delaware River, the camp at Valley Forge, the Conway affair, and Howe's "going away party,"--but is strongest in offering his analysis of the campaign. Simply, Taafe credits Washington for waging a successful campaign by waging a war of attrition, in which the survival of his army and time threatened to wear down British support for the war. At the same time, he criticizes the tactically successful Howe with a gross failure to develop a war-winning strategy and integrate it with his military campaigns. In other words, Washington understood the nature of revolutionary conflict while Howe persisted in fighting an 18th century European war. Taaffe offers ample support for his argument, tracing Washington's opportunistic approach to battle and Howe's persistent belief that he must either crush the American army or receive reinforcements sufficient to exert the crown's authority beyond the coastal enclaves he was able to garrison. In doing so, he offers a valuable reminder of the need to integrate military operations with political aims given the context in which a war takes place.Yet, something is missing. The previous reviewer noted an extreme paucity of maps, a concern with which this reviewer wholeheartedly agrees. Offering a campaign history without at least one solid campaign or geographical map and battle maps that are barely useful is disappointing. Taaffe occasionally slips into contemporary colloquial phrases that can be jarring. That said, by themselves, neither limitation is fatal. Instead, The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778 left me disappointed largely because it left me wanting more. Due perhaps to the book's brevity (just 238 pages), Taaffe only summarizes significant events rather than really exploring them. For example, he largely passes off the Conway affair, in which Washington mobilized political resources and employed his considerable political talents to fend off a "conspiracy" to replace him with Horatio Gates, as largely a figment of Washington's imagination, if not the purposeful victimization of General Conway in order to make an example of him. Just because Conway was arguably guilty of a mere indiscretion, if not the specific indiscretion for which he was attacked, does not mean that he was not in fact conspiring with Gates and his allies to replace Washington. Indeed, Henry Laurens, the President of Congress, clearly believed that there was a movement afoot to remove Washington from command. Taaffe seems not to appreciate the degree to which some politicians (including Washington) will seize on a tactical opportunity in a larger political campaign, just as military commanders do in warfare. One suspects that's not the case, but the book leaves that impression. The battle of Monmouth receives similar treatment. While he addresses the strengths and weaknesses of Washington's management of the battle, Taaffe doesn't provide enough information for a reader to adequately assess Charles Lee's role and whether the charges preferred against him were justified.In the end, Taaffe has produced a solid single-volume history of the campaign. It is analytically strong, but lacks some of the detail and richness that would have made it a more pleasurable read. Pick up a used copy and avoid paying the full retail price.

Stephen R. Taaffe, a history professor in Texas, attempts to describe and interpret the campaign around Philadelphia in 1777-1778 between Washington's Continental army and the British army under Lord Howe. The results are mixed. In short, this book is interesting, but as a military campaign narrative, it suffers from several intrinsic flaws. The author also makes some rather simplistic efforts to draw some overly broad conclusions about the campaign. On the plus side, the author covers some neglected but important aspects of the campaign that are often left out of standard histories that focus on the major engagements such as Brandywine and Germantown. In particular, the author's description of the British efforts to clear the Delaware River forts in late 1777 is first-rate. Overall, this book fills in gaps that other books miss or gloss over, but it does not deliver the kind of unique details that would cement its place in Revolutionary War literature.This book has several weaknesses that diminish its value. Probably the weakest element of this book is the maps, which simply do not allow the reader to follow the author's campaign narrative very well. The five maps are far too basic and show far too little detail to be useful. Oddly, the author provides no decent map of Philadelphia and its immediate environs, including Valley Forge. Another key weakness of this book is the relatively limited military detail provided, particularly in regard to order of battle information. For example, very few British units are specifically identified in this volume, although the author often refers to generic "light infantry" or "grenadier" units. Furthermore, the author's battle narratives of the main engagements are overly summarized and provide few details that are not present in other standard histories of the war. Given that the author only has to deal with three main battles, I expected the author to provide better information on casualties and strengths (like how much artillery did each side have?) than he actually did.The author also has an unfortunate tendency to use modern vernacular, often in a reckless style. For example, he inappropriately describes a feud between two American commanders as "a personal jihad." Later, he claims that "the British army occasionally maneuvered like a blindfolded child flailing away at a piñata" but it is unclear from his narrative that the British army under Howe was every "flailing away." Indeed, the author's narrative makes clear that the British army was very mission-focused and often out-maneuvered the American army. The author writes that Washington had to resist the urge to "engage the British in one giant Götterdämmerung," which is another silly and inappropriate use of a 20th Century term. The cumulative effect of this frequent and often inappropriate use of modern vernacular to describe an 18th Century campaign is to reduce the author's descriptive credibility.On the plus side, the author is able to summarize a great deal of information and deliver it in a coherent package. Professor Taaffe has meticulously researched this book and although it has its flaws, he does pack in a lot of information that is not always present in other accounts. Much of the author's assessment of the campaign comes down to his interpretation of Washington's leadership, which he assesses as often flawed at the tactical level but essentially sound at the operational level. On the other hand, the author castigates Lord Howe and the British army for fighting a tactically successful but ultimately sterile campaign. These interpretations are fairly standard views, at least for modern historians, and actually don't provide all that much insight. Few historians claim that Washington was a great tactician or battlefield commander - he generally wasn't - but this view of the American Revolution tends to skew the depiction in terms of the "great man" approach to history. Certainly Washington was a critical leader in the Revolution, as were many of his subordinates, but this approach to history tends to reduce historical outcomes of major events to the character of a few leaders - a method that is overly-simplistic at best and perhaps inaccurate. Put another way, since the Americans lost all the battles in the Philadelphia Campaign, would it have really made any difference if their commander had been Gates or Lee instead of Washington. Furthermore, even when the British were able to smash American armies, as at Long Island, Charleston and Camden, it still didn't change the fact that they could not control most of the population. In short, the American Revolution was far too complex an event to describe in terms of mere battlefield maneuvering as this author does, nor can it be reduced to the personalities of a few military leaders on either side.

I read the other two reviews for this book, and I can't really find fault with either of them. However, I would like to offer this review from a different perspective. My own interests, and therefore most of my reading, focus on World War 2 and more specifically on armored warfare. I am not at all well read on the American Revolution and from that perspective I found this book to be a great read. It is well written, and does a great job describing the events of this campaign in an interesting and easily understood way. While the book may not be detailed enough to completely satisfy someone who already has a solid background in Revolutionary War history it was perfect for someone like myself who is just getting their feet wet on the subject. When I was done with the book I felt I had gained a thorough understanding of the strategic situation faced by both sides and the variables of geography, resources, and politics that affected the campaign. This study may not be as detailed as some would like but it sets one up for further more detailed reading, and left me with a desire to read more on the subject.