Defensive Shield: An Israeli Special Forces Commander on the Frontline of Counterterrorism

This is an interesting, credible, and very readable rebuttal to the criticism aimed at the author by the initial report of the Winograd Commission, and the news coverage and leaks that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Second Lebanon War. Hirsch was blamed by Israel's post-war commission for problems in the war, and part of the reason for this book certainly is for him to make his own case, his personal Defensive Shield, as it were.Hirsch comes across as very bright but you can imagine that he may have appeared arrogant to his peers and superiors with his novel new concepts and terminology. For example: "With all of my experience, I have yet to find a solution other than maintaining cyclic processes of learning-changing-learning, with increasing speed, in order to baffle the enemy," or "I truly believe that maneuvering without distinct vector patterns and a chaotic and Unpredictable manner could collapse almost any rival system." In fact, his "swarming" and bypassing of strong points is consistent with the shock troops/blitzkrieg tactics the Germans developed at the end of World War I.The single longest part of the book is dedicated to the second Lebanon War, and the author's actions, decisions, and fights with military bureaucracy and superior officers. Assuming what he wrote is true, it certainly rebuts negative portrayals of Hirsch's role leading up to and in the war. He also makes clear that there was a lot more to the war, including IDF successes, then the battle at Bint Jbeil. Hirsch makes clear that it was the defense minister and chief of the general staff who ordered the conquest of Bint Jbeil for public relations reasons, which meant turning back from the planned advance, and even though the city had already been surrounded and the high ground around it taken.Hirsch makes the very good point that the only way to get the international community involved enough to impose a cease-fire on Hizbollah, which was firing thousands of rockets at Israeli civilians every day, was for the IDF to invade Lebanon. The invasion, therefore, was actually a peacemaking move rather than an offensive action on Israel's part. He never makes this point, but implicit in his argument is that the better strategy for Israel would have been just a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, which only occurred in the last week or 10 days of the war, rather than to bomb Beirut and other Lebanese cities in an attempt to get the Lebanese government to pressure Hizbollah to stop firing its rockets at Israeli civilians.It's interesting to read that in the late 1990s, the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI) reinvented the "signaling by escalation" concept that the US had tried and failed with in Vietnam 30 years earlier. Israel found out the hard way that you can't negotiate with an enemy that wants your complete destruction or withdrawal.It's also interesting that Hirsch's description of "shock and paralysis" efforts in 2002 during Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank presaged Donald Rumsfeld's "shock and awe" concept a year later in Iraq. Yet he does not draw the obvious conclusion that his eventual decision to destroy the Palestinian Authority's military and police infrastructure – destroying the enemy's forces – should've been done all along.He does contradict himself on a fundamental matter. He says repeatedly that what matters are "missions", not "plans". And get several times he states that he wanted to implement "the original Magen Ha'aretz plan that I knew and valued." It's hard to tell from this whether Hirsch was as hide-bound by an existing plan as were his commanders.Likewise, he criticizes higher command's tendency to break up organic units. Yet throughout his description of his division's actions in the Second Lebanon War, he frequently mentions his own detaching of battalions from brigades and companies from battalions, and assigning them to other units.He makes a statement that I can't understand. He makes an aside about "those who believe that 'no day was better than yesterday." This seems to echo the motto at the US Navy SEALs' training center, "The only easy day was yesterday". I can't believe he would criticize fellow special forces operators," so his comment is lost on me.My minor peeve: despite numerous mentions of the Nahal infantry brigade and it's 50th Battalion, for some reason the brigade does not appear in the book's index, even though the Givati brigade, which played a much lesser role in the narrative, does.

Mefeked,I could but only imagine if you were the Ramatkal.The IDF would have been in the most capable hands ever.Toda Achi

Gal Hirsch's book reads like a real life thriller as he describes the war in Lebanon and his exploits there. I can fully comprehend the intelligence, confidence and belief in country that was required for a General Officer to operate successfully in his position, which he appears to hold nothing back from. The need to push other thoughts away constantly to concentrate and envision the battlefield where lives depend on your decisions is both an honor and a sacred trust. Gal Hirsch must be equipped with a stronger soul then most to survive the attack on his life and the full physical and mental recovery he went through, the war in Lebanon itself, and finally the opportunistic politicians and leaders who sought to avert public opinion and consequences from themselves onto Gal Hirsch. Gal Hirsch is without a doubt is one of the most resilient people on the planet and someone we can all learn a lot from. This book is much more than a war story, but instead a life story that has been both incredibly blessed and challenged all at the same time.

Hirsch's memoir offers the unqiue perspective of division-level fighting at the front line of 2006 Second Lebanon War (which makes it a must-read, no comparable sources in English). The other book "34 Days" by Harel and Issacharoff is about political and strategical context/decision process , while Hirsch is about the military experience on the ground.There are a lot of finger-pointing and blaming after the war, so it's not a surprise Hirsch takes the opportunity to tell his side of story. If you have some basic knowledge of war, you will see why Hirsch sometimes explains in DETAIL of certain decision or event. But this is of course common in memoirs, this is still a good book overall.

I liked this book for the technical understanding of the IDF it gave me. I learned about the tough neighborhood Israel is in and how tough the warriors of the IDF have to be to defend their country. I also learned about the love the soldiers of the IDF have for their country and their comrades in arms. And, sadly, I learned of the perfidy of the politicians in and outside the IDF who failed to behave honorably and morally, and who caused so much pain to Gal Hirsh, the IDF and the country of Israel.I recommend this book to anyone who enjoys military writing and particularly military writing about Israel.This book is truly a 5 star effort by BG Hirsh, and I thank him and the IDF comrades who stood up for the truth and for him when it could cost them dearly.

A must read for anyone interested in the IDF. This is a first-hand account, from the viewpoint of one of Israel's most decorated soldiers. Gal Hirsch walks you through each battle and war as if you were right along side of him. I'm actually surprised that the Israeli Military Censors allowed this to be released. My fear is always that Israel's enemies will learn the IDF's methods and operations from books like this. Gal's descriptions of battle and the ethos of commanding battalions during war is heart-wrenching to say the least.I reccomend this book to anyone interested in Israel, people, its culture and its military.

Very interesting, but in some places too much detail in the military behind the scenes event - although he did indicate that this was so in the forward. NEEDS MAPS! It was difficult to follow the military progress without them. However, anyone interested in this period of Israeli history should read the book!

Very good book, very interesting

Fascinating read. Mix of fighting history, ethos and ethics, political intrigue and shannigans, leadership, war fighting / action; and philosophical point of view on future strategies for managing guerilla and military conflicts on Israel's border. In part highly inspiring; and in part disconcerting.

Amazing leadership of a warrior, a man, a husband and father. A true patriot of Israel. A very personal story.