Metaphors We Live By Paperback – April 15, 2003

This book could be considered to be one of the most intellectually honest of any book in print, for it unashamedly deals with commonsense notions of how the human mind deals with the world. One sometimes gets the impression that some works, especially on the philosophy of mind, tend to mystify or glamorize the workings of the mind. This book gives much weight to the use of metaphors for this purpose, and in doing so is faced with just how efficacious these metaphors are. The ordinary human conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical it argues, and that metaphors are the predominant mode of cognition. The evidence for their assertion comes primarily from linguistics, and they give numerous examples of the metaphors that are employed by humans in everyday discussion and interactions with others. The authors emphasize though that metaphor is not just a linguistic notion, but that human thought processes themselves are largely metaphorical. So how do we study the metaphorical nature of thought? The author's answer is simple: we use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts. This will allow an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities.The authors are careful to point out that the use of metaphors does, possess a notion of entailment, and that metaphorical entailments are able to characterize a coherent system of metaphorical concepts. Thus this system is not loose and unstructured, but rather similar in fact to the many systems of logic that one finds in computer science and in research in artificial intelligence. However, being able to view one aspect of a concept in terms of another will mask other aspects of this concept, and the authors give several interesting examples of this. When a concept is structured by a metaphor it is always partially structured, for otherwise the metaphor and the concept it is trying to understand would be identical. The metaphorical concepts can be extended however, and be deployed in a way of thinking traditionally called "figurative."Along with these structural metaphors, the authors discuss `orientational metaphors', that serve to organize an entire system of concepts with respect to one another. As their name implies, these metaphors usually involve spatial orientation, and originate in human cultural and physical experience. Several examples of orientational metaphors are given, and they give what they consider to be plausible explanations of how they arise in experience. They remind the reader though that these explanations are not set in stone. However they clearly believe, and they emphasize this in the book, that metaphors cannot be understood or represented independently of its experiential basis. A metaphor is inseparable from its experiential basis.The philosophical reader will probably want to know how the metaphorical nature of thought connects with a "theory of truth". The authors don't resist flirting with the boundaries of philosophy, and give a rather lengthy discussion of metaphors and "truth." The authors clearly do not believe in the traditional Western notion of objective, absolute, and unconditional truth. They do however vigorously put forward a notion of truth which they believe meshes with their paradigm of metaphor.Truth, the authors believe, depends on "categorization", which means that statements are only true relative to some understanding of them, that understanding always involves human categorization arising from experience and not from inherent properties, that statements are true only relative to the properties emphasized by the categories used in the statement, and that categories are not fixed and not constant.The authors then put forward an explanation of how a sentence can be understood as true, before tackling the general case of metaphors. To understand a sentence as being true in a particular situation involves both having an understanding of the sentence and of the situation. But to understand a sentence as being true it suffices to understand only approximately how it fits the understanding of the situation. Thus the authors introduce a metric, i.e. a notion of closeness between the situation and the sentence that fits this situation. Obtaining this fit may require several things to happen, such as "projecting" an orientation onto something that has no inherent orientation, or providing a background for the sentence to make sense.Having detailed what is involved in understanding a simple sentence as being true, the authors then state that including conventional metaphors does not change anything. The understanding of truth for conventional metaphors can be done in terms of metaphorical "projection" and in terms of nonmetaphorical "projection". In metaphorical projection understanding of one thing is done in terms of another kind of thing, whereas in nonmetaphorical projection only one kind of thing is involved. The case of new metaphors does not involve essentially anything more than the case of conventional metaphors.The authors summarize their "experientalist" theory of truth as the understanding of a statement as being true in a given situation when the understanding of the statement fits the understanding of the situation closely enough for the purposes at hand. This theory, they say, does mesh with some aspects of the correspondence theory of truth but rejects the notion of a "correspondence" between a statement and some state of affairs in the world. The correspondence between a statement and that state of affairs is mediated they say by the understanding of that statement and the state of affairs. In addition, truth is always relative to the conceptual system used to understand situations and statements. Further, the understanding of something involves putting it into a coherent scheme relative to a conceptual system. The author's theory of truth is thus reminiscent of the familiar coherence theories of truth. In addition, understanding is always grounded in experience, with the conceptual systems arising from interaction with the environment. Their theory of truth does not require a notion of "absolute" truth, and most interestingly, and most provocatively, individuals with different conceptual systems may understand the world differently, and have different criteria for truth and reality.The key word is "different": an interesting project would be to quantify this.

This is not easy reading, probably because it was written for nerds like me. At first I thought this was just a reference book about different kinds of metaphors but there is more to this book than just metaphors. It incorporates philosophy, psychology, scientific reasoning, the meaning and purpose of myths, and so on, because one way or another metaphors themselves cover all these aspects. This is a really excellent book for studying how the mind works or reasons so I will treasure this book forever.And yes, my description incorporated a few pretty interesting metaphors which are both true and objective.

In an interesting (though a bit technical) way George Lakoff describes (quite convincingly and with evidence, I must say) his vision of the role metaphors play in our life.Several concepts:- metaphors are fundamentally conceptual. We first of all think in metaphors. Metaphors language is secondary- metaphors are based on everyday experience- many concepts are defined primarily metaphorically (e.g. love is a journey, partnership, magic, madness, dissolution of two into one, ...)- metaphors not only can describe, but can form reality. By highlighting some aspects of experience and hiding another, they influence our concepts, which influences our thoughts and feelings, which influences our actions, thus changing reality- as a consequence metaphors can become self-fulfilling prophecies- it is important to be conscious about what metaphors do we useOverall I would recommend this book to readers who are:- interested in linguistics- interested in perception, cognition and psychology in general- who are not afraid to fight through somewhat technical text

I thought this book was boring at first because of all the linguistic examples, a lot of which I just glazed over to get to the next paragraph, unfortunately it comes with the territory, and really you won't have to deal with much at all in the second half of the book. Really though this book is a banger, my highlighter was going crazy. Will be really good to look back at many times in the future. Metaphors lend structure to concepts, concepts give structure to thought and action. Knowledge on this subject is very fundamental because there is so much overlap with other philosophical topics.

An excellent, systematic analysis of phrases that build up the seemingly random system the whole language uses, without the users giving the slightest thought to it. It starts out stealthily with phrases we all use all the time and develops the topic into a full, coherent, philosophical system which is built up in a perfectly logical way and governs all social, scientific, everyday etc. discourses. Not the easiest read at all but provides a lot of background (food for thought - why food?) to the language, not forgetting, either, that other languages my operate based on a different metaphorical system. The book is not new at all but, having lost my original copy, I find it indispensable that I acquired it again as I don't think anything similar and deep has since been published.