--- product_id: 10610206 title: "Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General" price: "45964CFA" currency: XOF in_stock: true reviews_count: 13 url: https://www.desertcart.sn/products/10610206-lost-victories-the-war-memoirs-of-hitlers-most-brilliant-general store_origin: SN region: Senegal --- # Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General **Price:** 45964CFA **Availability:** ✅ In Stock ## Quick Answers - **What is this?** Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General - **How much does it cost?** 45964CFA with free shipping - **Is it available?** Yes, in stock and ready to ship - **Where can I buy it?** [www.desertcart.sn](https://www.desertcart.sn/products/10610206-lost-victories-the-war-memoirs-of-hitlers-most-brilliant-general) ## Best For - Customers looking for quality international products ## Why This Product - Free international shipping included - Worldwide delivery with tracking - 15-day hassle-free returns ## Description Originally published in Germany in 1955, and in England and the United States in 1958, this classic memoir of WWII by a man who was an acknowledged military genius and probably Germany's top WWII general, is now made available again. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein described his book as a personal narrative of a soldier, discussing only those matters that had direct bearing on events in the military field. The essential thing, as he wrote, is to "know how the main personalities thought and reacted to events." This is what he tells us in this book. His account is detailed, yet dispassionate and objective. "Nothing is certain in war, when all is said and done," But in Manstein's record, at least, we can see clearly what forces were in action. In retrospect, perhaps his book takes on an even greater significance. Review: Not for everyone - The five stars is for what it is supposed to be-- a detailed military memoir by an exceptional leader of German armed forces. Manstein was by any judgment a first rate staff officer, who excelled with troops and shone in use of combined force tactics and strategy on a large scale. His impact in WWII was immense -- on both the Western and Eastern Front. He was also convicted for war crimes and served four years of an 18 year sentence noted in a 1981 introduction. That is not noted in the original edition which I also have. He was not a political general, i.e. he was not a Nazi Party member and had long credentials as a professional soldier and offspring of professional soldiers. He had Hitler's ear frequently and stood up to him more than most. Evidence (from other sources) indicated that one of his orders referred to a need to eliminate "Jewish Bolshevism" once and for all. There's no point in retrying his case here,but it does affect the way some of his writing is interpreted. Some of his comments should be read knowing that he had only recently been released from prison. Manstein had a stellar reputation before the war, although he angered some old guard when he waffled on a plan to confront Hitler. In a critical phase at the opening of the war, he was chief of staff to von Rundstedt and took part in military planning. Some of his innovative proposals were passed over. As the Germans planned their attack into France, the Belgians captured some of the Fall Gelb, or Code Yellow plans, essentially another revision of the basic Schlieffen used in WWI. The allies were pleased because it confirmed their basic planning in reaction to such an invasion. The Germans, however, knew that the Allies knew. So the plan was revised again. Rundstedt and Manstein had already been pushing for the plan. An interview was arranged with Hitler. Manstein describes a HItler who was engaged, understood the concepts and had an excellent grasp on technology. Manstein immediately by memo recounted Hitler's agreement with his plan and the final order included its elements. No military plan for large troop movements is ever simple. A critical element in Manstein's plan was sending a major force with tanks through the Ardennes, something thought too difficult. If the plans early phases were successful, the Allies would have little chance to recover. He and most authorities credit the Ardennes drive, orchestrated by Rundstedt and Guderian and not without difficulty, as the major factor in the utter defeat of the Allies in Northern Belgium. Germany held back its armor, leaving mopup to infantry and aircraft. That allowed the evacuation of nearly 340-thousand troops including 26,000 French to be evacuated. Manstein cites three possible reasons; Goring's ego and m aking peace with Britain were two. The third is currently considered the most likely, that Hitler acceded to his generals who wanted to save their armor for the second phase of the French campaign. As Manstein points out, despite the loss of their equipment, the success of the the Dunkirk evacuation later allowed Brittish troops to fight in Africa and Italy. Despite all the success, Manstein thought more could have been achieved. It is here that he sums up Hitler's ultimate weakness, one that worsened. HItler had a firm grasp of operational problems, but lacked the professional training to know when large risks should be accepted. In part because Americans have developed a self-righteous attitude abouut all things French, it's worth repeating Manstein's comment that even had better judgment and energy been shown, the French would have still been destroyed/defeated. Manstein's 38 Corps played a minor role in the battle for France. Manstein deals in detail with the rivalries and factions as Germany turned toward Britain and an invastion in a "between campaigns chapter. After the decision was made to invade Russsia instead of Britain, Manstein moved to 56 Panzer Corps as commander in the early phase Panzer Dash. He praises the quality of the Waffen SS troops and termss it a terrible mistake to have set them up as a separate military organization. He argues that their casualties were disproportionate to their gains ... and that they drained the Army of potential NCOs. Manstein's victory in the Crimea and the annihilation of a powerful Soviet force --Freeing up the 11th Army -- was in his high water mark. He was made field marshal -- and Hitler soon ordered him to take his Army to join the seige of Leningrad, but having had little effect in tthe ill-advised move, Hitler ordered 11 Army to begin moving south again. By this time, Manstein had lost some close associates and his oldest son had been killed and he was shortly named commander of the Don Army Group. Although a Hitler favorite for being a winner, Manstein had not previously reported directly to Hitler. He comments until that point he had felt Hitler's influence on the military only indirectly and from far away. That changed. In the 50s, it had already been fashionable to blame Hitler for everything and he became a cartoon character. Manstein puts a different light on a much more complex man but the end result is no more favorable to Hitler. His analysis of Hitler as strategist and warlord is complex and far reachingg. There is a chapter dedicated to "Hitler as Supreme Commander" including his adoption of Stalin's strategy of holding on to every piece of ground. From this point, Manstein's tale (amid some triumphs) is on a downward trajectory. Stalingrad. Another winter in South Russia and the defensive battles of 1943 and 1944. Manstein drives close enough to encircled Stalingrad to make a breakout possible, but Hitler orders it held at all costs. Paulus and his army are lost and the relief is in vain. The lost victories, those won and those that could have been won, are adding up. But Hitler rejects every plan that might bring victory or at least a stalemate. German troops continue to inflict fearsome casualties on the Russians, The quality of their troops kept declining, but there were always more. This is not a technical book, but it is dense with military thought and considered criticism of Hitler. It must all be in a context. It is one man's view -- and one that is considered by military historians. It will probably be in print as long as there is a military. While HItler would not have used the phrase "Stay the Course" but he said the equivalent in idiom Except that he didn't want to talk to anyone and began isolating himself.When people saw him, he lashed out. He made the mistake and everyone else paid the price. The shame is that it still continues. I cannot regret these lost victories any more than I can wish that my native South had won that war. It's probably a coincidence but still ironic that a new book about Stonewall Jackson is called "Lost Victories. It is possible to understand the pangs of lost victories ... without wishing for a change in result. What is more difficult is to understand why wars that cannot be won are fought -- why the course must be stayed -- why criticism of the leadership is so bad. If the best Germany could hope to achieve against the Soviet Union, planning for that should have started before millions of people lost their lives -- for nothing. Manstein makes the point well, that just because the political arm can order something does not make it right or wise. From a Nazi general yet! Review: Valuable When Read in Context - An incisive, well-written view of important WWII battles from the front row, this book is importantly balanced and enhanced by the accompanying commentary providing needed context about the author and his point of view. Manstein's role in forming post-war judgments on the Wehrmacht was significant, and the commentary helps place this book in its historical context. I found that the unit-by-unit battlefield detail could be wearying, as it was difficult to follow and Kindle does not do maps particularly well. Some of this was aimed, no doubt, at acknowledging the efforts of comrades in arms. The larger assessments were far more interesting to me, including those of Hitler as a military commander/strategist and the Wehrmacht's command, war and political issues. There is an unmistakable defensiveness to the narrative, certainly influenced by post-war and post-hoc concerns. Some of this seems to stem from Prussian military pride and tradition, offended by Hitler's direct involvement in military decisions and operations. But there is also a great silence about the the political units operating within his jurisdiction. Both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army fielded political authorities tasked with carrying out ideological warefare. These units on both sides were responsible for an appalling array of crimes against humanity. Tellingly Manstein describes the work of the Red Army's political commissars in influencing military decisions and operations, but says nothing at all about the work of their counter-part German political units, whose crimes he was ultimately made to answer for after the war. Taken in context, this is an informative and, at times, fascinating read of significant battles by an important commander. However, it is not by any means a full and frank record of those events. ## Technical Specifications | Specification | Value | |---------------|-------| | Best Sellers Rank | #251,875 in Books ( See Top 100 in Books ) #179 in German History (Books) #545 in WWII Biographies #1,895 in World War II History (Books) | | Customer Reviews | 4.4 out of 5 stars 659 Reviews | ## Images ![Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General - Image 1](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/71E9R4+eeSL.jpg) ## Customer Reviews ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Not for everyone *by O***G on July 8, 2006* The five stars is for what it is supposed to be-- a detailed military memoir by an exceptional leader of German armed forces. Manstein was by any judgment a first rate staff officer, who excelled with troops and shone in use of combined force tactics and strategy on a large scale. His impact in WWII was immense -- on both the Western and Eastern Front. He was also convicted for war crimes and served four years of an 18 year sentence noted in a 1981 introduction. That is not noted in the original edition which I also have. He was not a political general, i.e. he was not a Nazi Party member and had long credentials as a professional soldier and offspring of professional soldiers. He had Hitler's ear frequently and stood up to him more than most. Evidence (from other sources) indicated that one of his orders referred to a need to eliminate "Jewish Bolshevism" once and for all. There's no point in retrying his case here,but it does affect the way some of his writing is interpreted. Some of his comments should be read knowing that he had only recently been released from prison. Manstein had a stellar reputation before the war, although he angered some old guard when he waffled on a plan to confront Hitler. In a critical phase at the opening of the war, he was chief of staff to von Rundstedt and took part in military planning. Some of his innovative proposals were passed over. As the Germans planned their attack into France, the Belgians captured some of the Fall Gelb, or Code Yellow plans, essentially another revision of the basic Schlieffen used in WWI. The allies were pleased because it confirmed their basic planning in reaction to such an invasion. The Germans, however, knew that the Allies knew. So the plan was revised again. Rundstedt and Manstein had already been pushing for the plan. An interview was arranged with Hitler. Manstein describes a HItler who was engaged, understood the concepts and had an excellent grasp on technology. Manstein immediately by memo recounted Hitler's agreement with his plan and the final order included its elements. No military plan for large troop movements is ever simple. A critical element in Manstein's plan was sending a major force with tanks through the Ardennes, something thought too difficult. If the plans early phases were successful, the Allies would have little chance to recover. He and most authorities credit the Ardennes drive, orchestrated by Rundstedt and Guderian and not without difficulty, as the major factor in the utter defeat of the Allies in Northern Belgium. Germany held back its armor, leaving mopup to infantry and aircraft. That allowed the evacuation of nearly 340-thousand troops including 26,000 French to be evacuated. Manstein cites three possible reasons; Goring's ego and m aking peace with Britain were two. The third is currently considered the most likely, that Hitler acceded to his generals who wanted to save their armor for the second phase of the French campaign. As Manstein points out, despite the loss of their equipment, the success of the the Dunkirk evacuation later allowed Brittish troops to fight in Africa and Italy. Despite all the success, Manstein thought more could have been achieved. It is here that he sums up Hitler's ultimate weakness, one that worsened. HItler had a firm grasp of operational problems, but lacked the professional training to know when large risks should be accepted. In part because Americans have developed a self-righteous attitude abouut all things French, it's worth repeating Manstein's comment that even had better judgment and energy been shown, the French would have still been destroyed/defeated. Manstein's 38 Corps played a minor role in the battle for France. Manstein deals in detail with the rivalries and factions as Germany turned toward Britain and an invastion in a "between campaigns chapter. After the decision was made to invade Russsia instead of Britain, Manstein moved to 56 Panzer Corps as commander in the early phase Panzer Dash. He praises the quality of the Waffen SS troops and termss it a terrible mistake to have set them up as a separate military organization. He argues that their casualties were disproportionate to their gains ... and that they drained the Army of potential NCOs. Manstein's victory in the Crimea and the annihilation of a powerful Soviet force --Freeing up the 11th Army -- was in his high water mark. He was made field marshal -- and Hitler soon ordered him to take his Army to join the seige of Leningrad, but having had little effect in tthe ill-advised move, Hitler ordered 11 Army to begin moving south again. By this time, Manstein had lost some close associates and his oldest son had been killed and he was shortly named commander of the Don Army Group. Although a Hitler favorite for being a winner, Manstein had not previously reported directly to Hitler. He comments until that point he had felt Hitler's influence on the military only indirectly and from far away. That changed. In the 50s, it had already been fashionable to blame Hitler for everything and he became a cartoon character. Manstein puts a different light on a much more complex man but the end result is no more favorable to Hitler. His analysis of Hitler as strategist and warlord is complex and far reachingg. There is a chapter dedicated to "Hitler as Supreme Commander" including his adoption of Stalin's strategy of holding on to every piece of ground. From this point, Manstein's tale (amid some triumphs) is on a downward trajectory. Stalingrad. Another winter in South Russia and the defensive battles of 1943 and 1944. Manstein drives close enough to encircled Stalingrad to make a breakout possible, but Hitler orders it held at all costs. Paulus and his army are lost and the relief is in vain. The lost victories, those won and those that could have been won, are adding up. But Hitler rejects every plan that might bring victory or at least a stalemate. German troops continue to inflict fearsome casualties on the Russians, The quality of their troops kept declining, but there were always more. This is not a technical book, but it is dense with military thought and considered criticism of Hitler. It must all be in a context. It is one man's view -- and one that is considered by military historians. It will probably be in print as long as there is a military. While HItler would not have used the phrase "Stay the Course" but he said the equivalent in idiom Except that he didn't want to talk to anyone and began isolating himself.When people saw him, he lashed out. He made the mistake and everyone else paid the price. The shame is that it still continues. I cannot regret these lost victories any more than I can wish that my native South had won that war. It's probably a coincidence but still ironic that a new book about Stonewall Jackson is called "Lost Victories. It is possible to understand the pangs of lost victories ... without wishing for a change in result. What is more difficult is to understand why wars that cannot be won are fought -- why the course must be stayed -- why criticism of the leadership is so bad. If the best Germany could hope to achieve against the Soviet Union, planning for that should have started before millions of people lost their lives -- for nothing. Manstein makes the point well, that just because the political arm can order something does not make it right or wise. From a Nazi general yet! ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐ Valuable When Read in Context *by N***A on September 10, 2014* An incisive, well-written view of important WWII battles from the front row, this book is importantly balanced and enhanced by the accompanying commentary providing needed context about the author and his point of view. Manstein's role in forming post-war judgments on the Wehrmacht was significant, and the commentary helps place this book in its historical context. I found that the unit-by-unit battlefield detail could be wearying, as it was difficult to follow and Kindle does not do maps particularly well. Some of this was aimed, no doubt, at acknowledging the efforts of comrades in arms. The larger assessments were far more interesting to me, including those of Hitler as a military commander/strategist and the Wehrmacht's command, war and political issues. There is an unmistakable defensiveness to the narrative, certainly influenced by post-war and post-hoc concerns. Some of this seems to stem from Prussian military pride and tradition, offended by Hitler's direct involvement in military decisions and operations. But there is also a great silence about the the political units operating within his jurisdiction. Both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army fielded political authorities tasked with carrying out ideological warefare. These units on both sides were responsible for an appalling array of crimes against humanity. Tellingly Manstein describes the work of the Red Army's political commissars in influencing military decisions and operations, but says nothing at all about the work of their counter-part German political units, whose crimes he was ultimately made to answer for after the war. Taken in context, this is an informative and, at times, fascinating read of significant battles by an important commander. However, it is not by any means a full and frank record of those events. ### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Great reading *by M***L on May 14, 2026* One of most best generals in world war 2. This person literally brought took France in 6 weeks by going through forest that armour couldn't go through. On Eastern front he almost beat the Russians except that battle of kursk. Which he was overwhelmed. He told Hitler to drop dead. Great book ## Frequently Bought Together - Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General - Panzer Leader - The Rommel Papers --- ## Why Shop on Desertcart? - 🛒 **Trusted by 1.3+ Million Shoppers** — Serving international shoppers since 2016 - 🌍 **Shop Globally** — Access 737+ million products across 21 categories - 💰 **No Hidden Fees** — All customs, duties, and taxes included in the price - 🔄 **15-Day Free Returns** — Hassle-free returns (30 days for PRO members) - 🔒 **Secure Payments** — Trusted payment options with buyer protection - ⭐ **TrustPilot Rated 4.5/5** — Based on 8,000+ happy customer reviews **Shop now:** [https://www.desertcart.sn/products/10610206-lost-victories-the-war-memoirs-of-hitlers-most-brilliant-general](https://www.desertcart.sn/products/10610206-lost-victories-the-war-memoirs-of-hitlers-most-brilliant-general) --- *Product available on Desertcart Senegal* *Store origin: SN* *Last updated: 2026-10-04*